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                                                                         PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 11-3229 
_______________ 
 
UTPAL AJITKUMAR DESAI, 
 
                                                                           Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
                                                                                Respondent 
____________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review from an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board No. A037-061-888) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Susan G. Roy 
____________________________ 
 
Argued May 22, 2012 
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed:  August 21, 2012 ) 
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Scott E. Bratton, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Margaret Wong & Associates 
3150 Chester Avenue 
Cleveland, OH 44114 
 Attorneys for Petitioner 
 
Tiffany L. Walters, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. 
Thomas W. Hussey, Esq. 
John M. McAdams, Jr., Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 Attorneys for Respondent 
 
_________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA).  A regulation known as the 
―post-departure bar,‖ which is codified at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(d), precludes a removed person from filing a motion 
to reopen immigration proceedings.  In Prestol Espinal v. 
Attorney General, 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011), we held 
the post-departure bar invalid to the extent it conflicted with a 
statute, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), 
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that grants aliens the right to file one motion to reopen under 
certain conditions.  We now consider whether the bar we 
rejected in Prestol Espinal can nonetheless be invoked by the 
agency as a basis for refusing to reopen proceedings sua 
sponte under a regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  We hold that 
it can. 
I 
 A native and citizen of India, Utpal Ajitkumar Desai 
was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident in 1980.  Eleven years later, Desai embarked on a 
prolific criminal career, which includes convictions for: 
burglary and criminal mischief (1991), burglary and 
conspiracy to commit burglary (1992), burglary (1992), theft 
(1993), theft in the third degree (1994), shoplifting (1997), 
possession of marijuana (2000), disorderly conduct (2001), 
and theft and possession of a controlled dangerous substance 
in the third degree (2002). 
 In 2008, Desai was charged with removability based 
on his 2002 conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance and his 1994 conviction for third-degree theft.  
Although he did not contest removability, he applied for relief 
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), alleging that 
his HIV-positive status made him vulnerable to 
discrimination and persecution in India.  The Immigration 
Judge (IJ) held that Desai had not demonstrated eligibility for 
CAT relief, the BIA affirmed, and we denied Desai‘s 
subsequent petition for review.  See Desai v. Att’y Gen., 330 
F. App‘x 333, 334–35 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 In February 2010, a year after Desai was removed to 
India, his 2002 conviction for possession of a controlled 
 4 
 
substance was vacated and relisted for a new trial.  That 
November, well after the ninety-day window for filing a 
timely motion to reopen had closed, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C), Desai filed a motion to reopen sua sponte.  
Motions to reopen sua sponte are governed by a regulation, 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), that states: 
The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider 
on its own motion any case in which it has 
rendered a decision.  A request to reopen or 
reconsider any case in which a decision has 
been made by the Board, which request is made 
by the Service, or the party affected by the 
decision, must be in the form of a written 
motion to the Board.  The decision to grant or 
deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within 
the discretion of the Board, subject to the 
restrictions of this section.  The Board has 
discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if 
the party moving has made out a prima facie 
case for relief. 
The BIA denied Desai‘s motion, finding that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider Desai‘s request because of the post-
departure bar, which provides: 
A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider 
shall not be made by or on behalf of a person 
who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or 
removal proceedings subsequent to his or her 
departure from the United States.  Any 
departure from the United States, including the 
deportation or removal of a person who is the 
subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal 
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proceedings, occurring after the filing of a 
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, 
shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion. 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d).  The BIA noted, further, that, even if it 
had jurisdiction, it would nonetheless deny Desai‘s motion on 
the merits. 
II 
 Our jurisdiction is governed by Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, amended by 
the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 
Stat. 231, which authorizes us to review final orders of 
deportation, exclusion, and removal.  In cases such as this 
one, where a petitioner is removable for having been 
convicted of an aggravated felony, our jurisdiction is limited 
to addressing the jurisdictional prerequisite, Restrepo v. Att’y 
Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 2010), and evaluating 
―constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a 
petition for review,‖ 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); accord 
Brandao v. Att’y Gen., 654 F.3d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 ―Because the BIA retains unfettered discretion to 
decline to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a deportation 
proceeding, this court is without jurisdiction to review a 
decision declining to exercise such discretion to reopen or 
reconsider the case.‖  Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 
475 (3d Cir. 2003).  Where, however, we are ―presented with 
a BIA decision rejecting a motion for sua sponte reopening, 
we may exercise jurisdiction to the limited extent of 
recognizing when the BIA has relied on an incorrect legal 
premise.‖  Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 
2011).  ―In such cases we can remand to the BIA so it may 
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exercise its authority against the correct ‗legal background.‘‖  
Id. (quoting Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 
2009)).  Following Pllumi, we exercise our jurisdiction in this 
case to examine the validity of the BIA‘s legal determination 
that the post-departure bar precluded its review of Desai‘s 
motion to reopen sua sponte. 
III 
 Desai claims the BIA erred in determining that it 
lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion because of the post-
departure bar of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d).  He relies on our 
decision in Prestol Espinal, where we invalidated the post-
departure bar after finding it inconsistent with IIRIRA, 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c), which grants an alien the right to file one 
motion to reopen, subject to certain restrictions.
1
  653 F.3d at 
224. 
 In Prestol Espinal, however, we invalidated the post-
departure bar only in those cases where it would nullify a 
statutory right, i.e., where a petitioner‘s motion to reopen falls 
within the statutory specifications.  Prestol Espinal does not 
discuss, or even acknowledge, motions to reopen that are filed 
out of time or otherwise disqualified under the statutory 
scheme.  Such motions, which may still be considered by the 
BIA as motions to reopen sua sponte, are not authorized by 
statute.  Instead, they arise under a regulation, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(a), that the Attorney General promulgated under her 
                                                 
1
 As we did in Prestol Espinal, we treat a motion to 
reconsider and a motion to reopen in pari materia for 
purposes of the post-departure bar.  See Prestol Espinal, 653 
F.3d at 217 n.3. 
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broad authority to review administrative determinations in 
immigration cases, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2).  Because 
the BIA considers motions sua sponte pursuant to a grant of 
authority from the Attorney General, there is no statutory 
basis for a motion to reopen in the sua sponte context.  See 
Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 661 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 In Prestol Espinal, we reasoned that ―the post-
departure bar regulation conflicts with Congress‘ clear 
intent.‖  653 F.3d at 224.  Although our conclusion was stated 
broadly and seemed to suggest that the post-departure bar was 
invalid in its entirety, our explanation made clear that we had 
only statutory motions to reopen or reconsider in mind: 
First, the plain text of the statute provides each 
―alien‖ with the right to file one motion to 
reopen and one motion to reconsider.  Second, 
the importance and clarity of this right has been 
emphasized by the Supreme Court in [Dada v. 
Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008)].  Third, Congress 
specifically considered and incorporated 
limitations on this right and chose not to include 
the post-departure bar, despite its prior 
existence in regulation.  Fourth, the post-
departure bar would eviscerate the right to 
reopen/reconsider by allowing the government 
to forcibly remove the alien prior to the 
expiration of the time allowance.  Fifth, 
Congress included geographic limitations on the 
availability of the domestic violence exception, 
but included no such limitation generally.  
Sixth, Congress specifically withdrew the 
statutory post-departure bar to judicial review in 
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conformity with IIRIRA‘s purpose of speeding 
departure, but improving accuracy. 
Id.  As we have explained, motions to reopen sua sponte like 
the one Desai filed in this case are not governed by that 
statutory scheme.  Thus, the concern driving our holding in 
Prestol Espinal—that the post-departure bar undermines an 
alien‘s statutory right to file one motion to reopen—does not 
extend to cases like this one, where neither that statutory right 
nor congressional intent is implicated.
2
 
 Our decision today finds further support in Zhang, 
where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ―consider[ed] the 
scope of the BIA‘s jurisdiction to reopen otherwise-final 
removal proceedings in response to a party‘s motion, where 
the motion to reopen is deficient under the INA and instead 
asks the Board to invoke its sua sponte authority.‖  617 F.3d 
at 654.  Distinguishing Zhang‘s case from those dealing with 
a statutory right to file a motion to reopen or a broad statutory 
grant of authority, the Second Circuit found that ―the BIA 
                                                 
 
2
 Desai‘s claim that the BIA incorrectly relied on 
Matter of Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646 (BIA 
2008), also is unavailing.  In Armendarez-Mendez, issued 
before Prestol Espinal, the BIA found that it lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain an alien‘s untimely motion requesting 
sua sponte reopening of his removal proceedings because he 
had filed it after his departure from the United States.  Id. at 
660.  While Armendarez-Mendez‘s broad suggestion that ―the 
departure bar rule remains in full effect‖ after IIRIRA even 
where an alien is exercising his statutory right to file a timely 
motion to reopen, id., has been abrogated by Prestol Espinal, 
its holding remains valid as applied to motions requesting sua 
sponte reopening for the reasons discussed above. 
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[was] not plainly erroneous in its position . . . that the 
departure bar limits its sua sponte jurisdiction‖ and that the 
BIA ―did not err in concluding that § 1003.2(d) deprived it of 
authority to consider [Zhang‘s] motion to reopen [sua sponte] 
after he was removed from the country.‖  Id. at 665; see also 
id. at 664 (―[T]his is not an instance where a statute vests an 
agency with broad authority that the agency has declined to 
exercise.‖).  We agree with, and adopt, the Second Circuit‘s 
analysis. 
 For the reasons stated, we hold that the BIA did not err 
when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Desai‘s motion to reopen sua sponte.  Therefore, we will 
deny his petition. 
